This paper discusses parametric reform options to control losses generated by a publicly managed pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system under alternative de"cit reduction (reform) strategies involving changes in contribution and replacement rates and statutory retirement ages. Two di!erent problems corresponding to di!erent pension reform strategies are considered using computational techniques. The techniques are illustrated through exercises employing data for the "nancially troubled pension system in Turkey.
Introduction
Publicly managed pension systems providing old-age or pension insurance coverage, face "nancial di$culties in many countries across the world. Most of these systems are run as pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes requiring pension payments to current retirees to be "nanced out of contributions collected from currently active workers and their employers. The primary reason these systems face "nancial di$culties is the increasing ratio of retirees to workers (the dependency ratio), most typically caused by the natural aging of population. Following from increasing life expectancies and declining fertility rates over time, population aging is essentially a demographic phenomenon and cannot be controlled by pension authorities or policy makers. Unless the resulting increases in dependency ratios can somehow be checked, pension balances will continue to deteriorate, eventually causing sizable de"cits. Avoiding such de"cits requires controlling dependency ratios through changes in statutory entitlement ages (or minimum retirement ages) and/or adjustments in the values of contribution and replacement rates.
A parametric pension policy reform, as it is sometimes called (Chand and Jaeger, 1996) , involves changing the existing values of pension program parameters within politically and demographically acceptable limits so as to prevent the size of pension de"cit from exceeding tolerable levels determined by governments. Such a reform may involve once-and-for-all as well as gradual changes in the values of contribution and replacement rates. However, the statutory retirement age is typically increased gradually through a predetermined time path. Regardless of the way they are introduced, new parameter values are expected to be compatible with the targeted level of de"cit and to allow for demographically realistic contribution and retirement periods. Because the new parameters would be picked by policy makers, the political feasibility of reform would also require avoiding con"gurations which might radically undermine the living standards of working and retiree populations. So, for policy makers to make Footnote 3 continued Economics in Boston (June 24}26, 1999) , which used an optimization framework with the objective function de"ned in such a way to allow policy makers to assign di!erent weights to alternative policy goals and is available upon request from the authors. Yet another consideration in picking the parameter con"guration to be introduced may be given to the intergenerational aspects of the distribution of reform's burden on presently living and future generations (see, for example Boll et al., 1994) .
Presently, it is possible for women/men to retire as early as 38/43 years of age in Turkey but by the major pension reform proposal which is currently awaiting the "nal approval of the President to become a law, the minimum retirement age for women/men would be 58/60. Under intensive pressure from trade unions and other groups, the government modi"ed the proposal to extend the transition period for gradual increases in the minimum retirement age to 10 years. informed choices, alternative con"gurations meeting these restrictions must be identi"ed.
The purpose of this paper is to identify a set of parametric reform options to rehabilitate the publicly run, PAYG pension system in Turkey under alternative strategies involving once-and-for-all, and gradual changes in pension parameters. The Turkish example is particularly interesting because the state pension system in Turkey already faces a severe "nancial crisis despite a relatively young population/workforce (Kenc and Sayan, 2000) . Unlike other countries where similar pension systems face "nancial di$culties largely due to population aging, the crisis of the Turkish system stems from the retirement ages that are exceptionally low by international standards. The evident need to increase minimum contribution periods/retirement ages distinguishes pension reform e!orts in Turkey from the experience of other countries, where policy makers had relatively little room to adjust retirement ages along with other two parameters (Sayan and Kiraci, 2000) . The numerical results reported in the paper make it possible to compare the magnitude of required increases in the retirement ages under each reform strategy considered.
The paper is organized in such a way that the explanation of each strategy is followed by a description of the relevant algorithm used to generate numerical results based on Turkish data. Section 2 describes the numerical optimization exercises carried out to identify parametric reform options for Turkish pension system under two di!erent reform strategies, discusses the implementation of algorithms employed and reports results. Section 3 concludes the paper by summarizing policy implications and lessons that can be drawn from the computational analysis.
Computational analysis of reform options
As pension reform becomes a higher priority in the policy agendas of many countries, a growing number of studies use numerical techniques to investigate parametric reform options for PAYG pension systems. The discussion in this section links up well with this literature, which is brie#y surveyed by Chand and Jaeger (1996) . Especially relevant studies include Halter and Hemming (1987) , Van den Noord and Herd (1994) , and Boll et al. (1994) , ILO (1996) and Sayan and Kiraci (2000) . The results here are also likely to provide useful inputs and experiment scenarios for dynamic overlapping generations general equilibrium analyses of social security reform, adding to an already sizable literature (see Joines et al., 1999 for a survey). Particularly good examples of overlapping generations general equilibrium analyses of parametric pension reform similar to that discussed here can be found in Sayan and Kenc (1999) and Miles (1999) . Huang et al. (1997) consider the general equilibrium impact of transition from a PAYG to a fully funded system. The rest of this section discusses the computational framework developed for this paper. The discussion begins by considering a once-and-for-all change in minimum retirement age and other pension parameters, proceeding thereafter to the issues arising with the constrained optimization problem.
Pension reform through a once-and-for-all change in system parameters
Even though a sudden and #at increase in minimum retirement age would likely be politically infeasible, consideration of such policies serves as a good starting point for our search for new pension parameters that balance the expenditures and revenues of a PAYG pension system.
Letting D represent the di!erence between total pension payments to the retirees and total contribution receipts over the speci"ed period of time running from, say, t to , we can write 
where CR is the average rate for employee and employer contributions combined (0(CR(1), RR the average replacement rate tying pension bene"ts to wages earned prior to retirement (0(RR(1), A the minimum retirement age (A(A M )mwa, where mwa is maximum working age), the discount rate, w ?R the number of workers at the age of a at time t, rw ?R the average real wage earned by active workers at the age of a at time t * adjusted for the earnings cap or wage ceiling that determines the maximum amount out of which contributions are collected, r P??R the number of pensioners who retired at the age of ra, but are aged a at time t, rw P??R\ ?\P? \ the average work time earnings of pensioners who retired at the age of ra, but are aged a at time t, (rw
where n is the number of years in averaging period * taken to be equal to 10 here), a the age index running from the beginning of working-life, a , to le, life expectancy in years (le'mwa), ra the actual retirement age index running from A to mwa, t the time index running from initial period, t , to , the end of model horizon, and t"t!t , with all variables and indices other than A, CR and RR taking their values beyond the control of pension authorities.
Given this notation, total pension payments to be made at any year t are calculated by multiplying the number of retirees, distinguished by their current ages and the ages of retirement, with the applicable pension for the corresponding age group. Applicable pensions at time t are calculated through an indexation scheme requiring each retiree to be paid a certain proportion, RR, of the 10-year average of real wages earned prior to retirement. Since a retiree who retired at age ra and is now aged a must have been collecting pensions for the past a}ra years, the average, wage ceiling-adjusted real wage income (s)he earned during the last 10 years of her/his career as a worker can be denoted by rw P??R\ ?\P? \ , implying that (s)he is entitled to collect RR% of this amount in pension payments. Each active worker aged a at time t, on the other hand, is paid rw ?R and contributions are collected at the rate of CR% of this income adjusted for the wage ceiling (i.e., the maximum level of wages or salaries by which contributions and pension payments are calculated). D in (1) therefore shows the di!erence between the sums of future (expected) pension payments and total contribution receipts in real present value terms over the time horizon considered. The time horizon for the computational exercises is chosen to be the period between 1995 and 2060. 1995 marks the period when Turkish pension de"cits began to reach alarming magnitudes. The time horizon ends in 2060, since Turkish population is projected to remain stable beyond this year, implying that a parametric pension reform introduced to avoid de"cits over this horizon would not need to be reversed afterwards.
Eq. (1) is taken as the objective function in a constrained optimization problem requiring the minimization of D with respect to A, CR and RR, subject to the exogenously given, projected values of real wages, retiree and active worker populations and other relevant constraints. Given that publicly managed pension systems do not typically seek surpluses (with D(0), however, a more realistic and relevant problem to consider would be to identify A, CR and RR values which would be compatible with a certain nonnegative value for D over the period under consideration. Since expenditures exceed receipts when D'0, choice of a positive target value for D implies that the pension system is allowed to run a de"cit. Because many governments view pension systems as a channel to make income transfers to working and/or retiree populations, they would often be willing, in fact, to allow public pension systems to run &reason-able' de"cits * with the de"nition of reasonable varying across governments and macroeconomic conditions.
When considering this more realistic version of the pension reform problem for Turkey, the target level of pension de"cit over the 1995}2060 period was set equal to zero since the losses generated by the public pension schemes (and by With the absolute value operator, the global minimum for the objective function in (2) will be zero ruling out the possibility of pension system running a surplus over 1995}2060.
It must be noted that because of the multiplicative rw P??R\ ?\P? \ term in the objective function, this constraint cannot directly be incorporated into the objective function. the social security system at large) in this country have already reached alarming proportions (Topal, 1999; Sayan and Kiraci, 2000) . Given this target, the problem for the relevant time horizon would be Minimize "D"
!000 
where p ?R represents the year t population of age group a minus the number of unemployed adults who are at the age of a in time t. Hence, the equality constraint in (2) states that anyone who is older than the minimum retirement age A and not unemployed at time t must either be a worker or a retiree who has been collecting pensions for the past a}ra years. Since the minimum retirement age marks the lower limit for summation in the "rst constraint, any increase in A introduced as part of a pension reform would increase the size of working population at the expense of the retiree population. So, each counterfactual increase in A considered requires regenerating projections on the working population by age groups and retiree population by (current as well as the actual retirement) ages in such a way to satisfy the equality constraint, and recalculating applicable incomes for retirees and workers. This is, in fact, what raises the complexity of identifying the [A, CR, RR] triplets minimizing "D", and prevents the use of standard nonlinear programming solvers that come with commercially available software packages such as GAMS. To overcome the computational di$culty posed by this, a grid-search algorithm with a large data handling capacity was written in Gauss and used as described below.
Projected real wages and active worker/retiree populations by ages (aggregated over genders) were exogenously fed into the algorithm "rst. To make full use of the demographic projections available from ILO (1996) by age groups, the real wage series was projected into the year 2060 by taking into account the likely growth in economywide labor productivities as well as productivity di!erentials due to seniority so as to allow for real wage di!erences across di!erent age groups. The original ILO (1996) projections on working and retiree Since we took into account the possibilities of death, unemployment and early retirement due to disabilities over the entire model horizon, the actual process we followed to regenerate projections after every increase in A was more complicated than is described here. Such details are skipped as they do not directly contribute to the discussion in the rest of this paper.
Obviously, the exact timing of reform would a!ect the magnitude of changes that need to be introduced to statutory retirement ages and contribution/replacement rates. Since delays in legislating parametric reform would increase the initial level of de"cit to be dealt with, such delays would drive statutory retirement ages and contribution rates higher and/or replacement rates lower.
populations by age assumed that current pension regulations would be maintained over the 1995}2060 period, and hence, the current level of minimum retirement age would remain at its currently low level. Thus, each 1-year increase counterfactually introduced to the minimum retirement age during the search for optimal con"gurations of A, CR and RR required that population projections be manipulated in such a way to transfer retirees younger than the value of A under consideration to working population. So, after every incremental increase in A, the algorithm calculated the left-hand side of equality constraint in (2) and calculated the appropriate real income terms to "nd the associated value of intertemporal pension balance, "D". "D" was then recalculated by incrementing RR over (0, 1) interval by 0.05 each time and computing the corresponding value of CR. The combinations which yielded "D""0 are plotted in Fig. 1 . So, each point on the three-dimensional graph in the "gure corresponds to a combination of CR, RR and A balancing the contribution revenues and pension payments in real present value terms as required by the de"cit reduction target of the government.
The cross-section plot in the upper-right window in Fig. 1 shows the possible retirement ages associated with alternative replacement rates for a given contribution rate of 0.2, which corresponds to the average of rates currently applied by the three publicly run institutions providing pension coverage in Turkey. Also marked in the "gure in this window are current replacement rates of 0.65 and 0.95 used by the largest two of these institutions. The "gure shows that if the contribution rate is to be maintained at its current average of 20%, current replacement rates used by three pension institutions would require minimum retirement ages varying between 58 and 65 for the system to have a zero balance over the 1995}2060 period.
Pension reform through gradual increases in the retirement age
The foregoing discussion indicates that if pension parameters are changed once-and-for-all, the minimum retirement age must be at least 58. But if this rise in A is made e!ective for everyone immediately, thousands of workers who made their retirement plans under the pre-reform con"guration of parameters would have to stay at work for several more years than they originally intended Fig. 1 . The set of pension parameters that could eliminate the intertemporal pension de"cit over 1995}2060.
Since the relationship between working or retiree populations and the minimum retirement age is too complicated to be represented through a well-known functional form, the series were generated through an iterative process as in Section 2.1.
to. Because convincing workers to postpone retirement without notifying them well in advance would be very di$cult (if not impossible), such an increase in the retirement age is not politically feasible. If only the retirement age of junior workers is increased, on the other hand, it would be impossible to balance the pension de"cit until 2060. To avoid this, the problem can be formulated to allow the retirement age to be increased gradually over time, thereby leaving enough time for current workers to plan ahead.
In this alternative formulation, the objective is to minimize the di!erence between contribution revenues and pension payments over a path that the minimum retirement age will follow between 1995 and 2060, subject to a given value for CR and a given range for RR. Since the working and retiree populations at any given period t are functions of the retirement age as discussed in Section 2.1, the problem can now be expressed as
In this problem, a dynamic path was chosen for the retirement age by "nding the value of , a parameter capturing the rate of change of the retirement age over time. A variant of the search algorithm was used to "nd the values of minimizing the objective function for di!erent RR values lying in the given interval. For each value of considered, the corresponding minimum retirement age was calculated from the di!erence equation in the "rst constraint. (To solve the di!erence equation in the constraint for A M , we let A "43 and lim R A R "65 where 43 is the minimum retirement age that is currently in e!ect for male workers and 65 is a reasonably high upper limit for retirement age increases in Turkey * that is, we took mwa"65. ) , and retiree population, r(A R ), series which, in turn, were plugged into (3) to have the corresponding value of D I calculated. The same steps were repeated by considering a smaller (bigger) value for whenever D I turned out to be greater (smaller) than zero. The iterations were continued until the value of speci"ed to the sixth digit after the point could not be changed any longer. (This optimization exercise was repeated for replacement rates varying between 0.65 and 0.95.)
Since minimum retirement ages could only take integer values, it was impossible to get D I strictly equal to zero. But the search routine was highly successful as the optimal value of satis"ed the following inequality:
where the numerator on the left-hand side is D I *, the optimal value of D I , and the denominator is the sum of the components of the di!erence in D I H. So, this gives a performance indicator independent of currency units in which D I H is measured. The behavior of the ratio in (4) with respect to changes in is plotted in Fig. 2 We also investigated the path minimum retirement age would have followed, had the replacement rate also been allowed to adjust over time. Since allowing RR to change over time without specifying its path rendered the dimensions of the problem unmanageable with the previously employed search methods, a hybrid dynamic programming technique introduced in Fackler and Miranda (1999) was used to solve this problem by de"ning a time-dependent version of the Bellman equation (Intriligator, 1971; Miranda, 1999) . While providing important lessons for computational analysis, this exercise did not produce any results which could enrich the policy discussion in any signi"cant way. So, no further discussion on this exercise is given here but the results and a description of the implementation of this technique can be obtained from the authors.
To compare the results in Fig. 3 to those in Fig. 1 , one can consider the cases of replacement and contribution rates set at 0.65 and 0.20, respectively. Fig. 1 and the results in Table 1 indicate that under the once-and-for-all change scenario, minimum retirement age would be increased to 58 for everyone so as to render "D""0 at these rates. The gradual adjustment scenario allows some generations to retire (and hence, to begin drawing bene"ts and to stop contributing) earlier than this age but achieving "D"+0 would still be possible since later generations would be required to stay in the workforce beyond the age of 58. As the foremost contour in Fig. 3 indicates, the retirement age would be at least 58 for everyone who is in the workforce after 2028.
where H, the optimal value of , is observed to be equal to 1/30 approximately (0.033062 to be more precise).
The three-dimensional plot in Fig. 3 shows the dynamic paths of the minimum retirement age resulting under H across di!erent replacement rates considered.
The results behind Fig. 3 indicate that for the intertemporal pension de"cit over the 1995}2060 period to be eliminated, people to enter the workforce in the aftermath of reform would be facing a minimum retirement age of 58 or more, whereas currently active workers who are planning to retire as early as 43 years of age will have to postpone retirement by a number of years depending upon their current age. Table 1 reports the number of years remaining until Fig. 3 . Behavior of minimum retirement age over time for di!erent replacement rates.
The retirement age for people covered by the OASI program in the U.S. to be eligible for full bene"ts, for example, will be increased by 2 months per year until 2022 (SSA, 1997).
While alternative assumptions about the nature of demographic transition and workforce participation behavior are also likely to a!ect results, the absence of alternative population and workforce projections prevented us from carrying out sensitivity tests for changes in projected population and workforce series here. This, however, is one of the directions our research is planned to take in near future. retirement for workers at di!erent ages in 1995 under both reform scenarios considered. Table 2 presents the same results for workers in di!erent age groups in 2040 (i.e., people who were yet to be born in 1995). (To assure comparability of results across scenarios, all results reported in the tables were obtained by assuming a replacement rate of 0.65 and a contribution rate of 0.20.)
Under the scenario in Section 2.1, when CR"0.20 and RR"0.65, the minimum retirement age would have to be increased to 58 for everyone regardless of whether they are currently in or yet to enter the work force. But since forcing workers who are at the age of 42 (41, 40, etc.) at time t and planning to retire at t#1 (t#2, t#3, etc.) to postpone retirement plans for 16 (or more) years would not be fair (if not infeasible), the present scenario gradually increasing the retirement age over time would be more sensible. This is, in fact, the reform strategy that has recently been put into use in several OECD countries (Kohl and O'Brien, 1998; SSA, 1997) , even though gradual increases in retirement age are determined in a less-sophisticated fashion. 33  10  58  25  53  20  32  11  58  26  54  22  31  12  58  27  54  23  30  13  58  28  55  25  29  14  58  29  56  27  28  15  58  30  56  28  27  16  58  31  56  29  26  17  58  32  57  31  25  18  58  33  57  32 
Sensitivity of results
Since the results reported so far are expected to change under alternative discount and productivity growth rate assumptions, the sensitivity of results with respect to these parameters is considered in this section.
The results are robust to changes in the projected real wage series resulting from small deviations from assumed productivity growth rates since real wage changes a!ect the revenues and expenditures of the pension system in the same direction. Similarly, the sensitivity of results to changes in the assumed value of discount rate, , remains su$ciently low not to raise serious concerns about the usefulness of the previous discussion.
Keeping the de"nition of pension balances in (1) in mind and starting from [A, CR, RR] triplets satisfying "D""0, a ceteris paribus reduction in the discount rate will increase the value of "D" above zero. To return this value back to zero, one or more of these pension parameters (statutory retirement age, A; contribution rate, CR, and replacement rate, RR) must adjust. The direction of change in each parameter required by a reduction in the discount rate, , can 33  10  58  25  61  28  32  11  58  26  61  29  31  12  58  27  62  31  30  13  58  28  62  32  29  14  58  29  62  33  28  15  58  30  62  34  27  16  58  31  62  35  26  17  58  32  62  36  25  18  58  33  62  37 intuitively be analyzed, by keeping the other two parameters constant. For optimal values of CR and RR satisfying "D""0, for example, statutory retirement age must be increased to counter the e!ect of a reduction in the discount rate on the desired pension balance. (By increasing the number of contributing workers and reducing the number of retirees drawing bene"ts, this will restore the desired balance at "D""0.) This implies that for given values of contribution and replacement rates, the optimal value of statutory retirement age is negatively related to changes in the discount rate. This intuitive reasoning is supported by sensitivity results reported in Table 3 which presents the optimal value of the statutory retirement age for alternative values of replacement rates and a contribution rate of 0.20, under each of the scenarios considered.
Conclusions
This paper discussed the identi"cation of parametric reform options to control losses generated by a publicly managed, PAYG pension system under Table 3 Minimum retirement ages for alternative replacement rates under di!erent discount rate assumptions when CR"0.20
Alternative replacement rates (the once-and-for-all change scenario)
Alternative replacement rates (the gradual adjustment scenario) alternative de"cit reduction (reform) strategies including one time jumps, as well as gradual changes in contribution/replacement rates and statutory retirement ages. For this purpose, two di!erent problems each corresponding to a di!erent pension reform strategy were analyzed using di!erent computational techniques applied to the Turkish pension system. The "rst problem involved identi"cation of alternative pension parameters compatible with a given target for revenueexpenditure balances of a pension system. The solution of the problem, obtained through a numerical search algorithm was shown to be non-unique unless additional constraints are imposed to re#ect the priorities of policy makers. It was argued that replacing the existing pension parameters at once rather than gradually over time could be particularly problematic if the new con"guration calls for higher retirement ages for everyone including workers who plan to retire soon. Given the di$culties in convincing such workers to postpone their retirement plans, an alternative reform strategy involving gradual increases in retirement age was considered by solving a constrained optimization problem in which the pension de"cit is minimized subject to a dynamic retirement age path and a one time change in replacement rates.
The results indicated that retaining current values of replacement and contribution rates while trying to eliminate Turkish pension de"cit over 1995}2060 period would require a substantial one-time increase in the minimum retirement age. If a gradual increase in the minimum retirement age is chosen instead, on the other hand, some generations will be allowed to retire at a lower age than the minimum age implied by the one-time jump scenario, but later generations will be required to stay in the workforce beyond this age.
